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It is argued that the three main quantum interpretations, Copenhagen, de Broglie-Bohm, and
Many-Worlds, support the Principle Q (Quantum): Not all what matters for physical phenomena
is contained in space-time. This principle underpins Born’s rule as well. So Principle Q may be the
best way to defining Quantum “from more fundamental principles”.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of Quantum is marked by interfer-
ence experiments with single particles: Double-Slit is
paramount. For the sake of our discussion it is conve-
nient to refer to a variant of this experiment using a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer as sketched in Fig.1. The
output ports of the second beam-splitter BS1(the output
ports of the interferometer) are monitored by correspond-
ing detectors D(0) and D(1): If the outcome (i.e.: which
of the two detectors counts) were determined before de-
tection by the path the particle travels, then half of the
time D(0) should count and half of the time D(1), and
the interference pattern would disappear, what is not the
case.
The experiment shows that with sufficiently weak in-
tensity of light, only one of the two detectors clicks: ei-
ther D(0) or D(1) (photoelectric effect). Nevertheless, for
calculating the counting rates of each detector one must
take into account information about the two paths lead-
ing from the laser source to the detector (interference
effect): The counting rate depends sinusoidally on the
optical path-length difference.
The whole “weirdness” of Quantum is contained in this
result:
It is this result and similar ones that led the found-
ing fathers to the insight that in quantum experiments
the outcomes are not determined before detection. This
insight was strengthened through two main further devel-
opments: “Bell theorem” proving that quantum exper-
iments violate criteria of local causality (Bell’s inequal-
ities) [1], and “Kochen and Specker theorem” proving
that measurements on quantum systems are contextual
(depend on what the experimenter decides to measure)
[2].
And it is also worth mentioning that this result de-
fines also the qubit. The pioneer quantum technologies,
cryptography (BB84-protocol) and computing (Deutsch-
algorithm), have been discovered and first technologically
implemented using single qubit interference.
Nonetheless, although one easily accepts “Bell’s nonlo-
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FIG. 1: Interference experiment: Laser light of frequency ω
emitted by the source enters a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
through beam-splitter (half-silvered mirror) BS0 and gets de-
tected after leaving beam-splitter BS1. The light can reach
each of the detectors D(1) and D(0) by the paths l and s;
the path-length l can be changed by the experimenter. For
calculating the counting rates of each detector one must take
into account information about the two paths leading from
the laser source to the detector (wave behavior). However,
with a single-photon source only one of the two detectors
clicks: either D(1) or D(0) (particle behavior): “one photon,
one count”, or conservation of energy. If a ∈ {+1,−1} labels
the detection values according to whether D(1) or D(0) clicks,
the probability of getting a is given by P (a) = 1
2
(1 +a cos Φ),
where Φ = ωτ is the phase parameter and τ = l−s
c
the optical
path.
cality” (violation of Bell’s inequalities by space-like sep-
arated measurements) and “KS contextuality” as signa-
tures of Quantum, one continues to wonder about what is
properly Quantum in single-particle interference, or ask
why the qubit is Quantum.
There is some irony in this: Demonstrating Bell’s
nonlocality involves space-like multipartite systems, and
hence does not apply to Hilbert spaces with prime dimen-
sion; plays a decisive role in 2 qubits systems correspond-
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2ing to “four state systems” or Hilbert spaces with d = 4,
but has no significance in single particle spin 3/2 systems,
which also correspond to Hilbert spaces with d = 4. And
contextuality is certainly more general than Bell nonlo-
cality, since it is holds for any system with a number of
systems equal or larger than 3 (Hilbert space with d > 2),
however it does not characterize single-particle interfer-
ence experiments (Fig.1), and in particular the qubit.
On the other hand one may wonder why a so success-
ful theory like quantum physics bears different interpre-
tations whose advocates like to present them as strongly
opposite to each other. As it has been pointed out, a
good theory should need no interpretation [3, 4].
In this letter we will comparatively discuss the three
main interpretations Copenhagen, de Broglie-Bohm, and
Many-Worlds in the light of the following two principles:
• Principle A (Accessibility): All that is in space-
time is accessible to observation (except in case of
space-like separation).
• Principle Q (Quantum): Not all what matters for
physical phenomena is contained in space-time.
We argue that Principle A should be acknowledged by
any sound experimental science. On this basis we show
that Principle Q is somewhat hidden in all the three
interpretations: These are not that divergent from each
other, but rather different ways of stating the same Prin-
ciple Q. Additionally this Principle Q characterises al-
ready two-state experiments like that in Fig.1: The qubit
is the cornerstone of Quantum, and having it does not
require systems with more than 2 states (Hilbert space
d > 2). So we conclude proposing to found Quantum on
Principle Q.
In searching for “more fundamental principles” behind
quantum formalism Max Born provides a useful compass:
“[it] is a philosophical question for which physical argu-
ments alone are not decisive.”[5]
II. COPENHAGEN
Single particle interference led to the Copenhagen (“or-
thodox”) interpretation, which considers crucial the mo-
ment of detection and postulates a so called “wavefunc-
tion collapse”. This rather cryptical name conflates two
different assumptions:
a) The decision of the outcome (which of the two de-
tectors counts) happens at the moment of detection.
b) At detection the outcome becomes “irreversibly
recorded” and can be observed.
The different pictures discussed in the following regard
assumption a). Interpretations regarding assumption b)
will be discussed in a separated paper and will allow us
to complete the definition of Quantum.
Assumption a) implies “nonlocal” coordination of de-
tection events, or more accurately of decisions at detec-
tors between “to count” or “not to count”.
FIG. 2: Einstein’s gedanken-experiment: Let S be a di-
aphragm provided with a small opening O, and P a hemi-
spherical photographic film of large radius. Electrons impinge
on S in the direction of the arrows. “There are de Broglie
waves, which impinge approximately normally on S and are
diffracted at O. Behind S there are spherical waves, which
reach the screen P and whose intensity at P is responsible
[massgebend] for what happens at P.” (See [6] p. 486: in the
text both ’P’ and ’S’ are confusedly referred to as “screen”
(e´cran)).
As it is well known, Einstein argued against this “non-
locality at detection” already in 1927, at the 5th Solvay
conference in Bruxelles [6]. He did this on the basis of
the famous gedanken-experiment in Fig.2 concluding (er-
roneously) to a conflict with relativity:
“But the interpretation [II], according to which |ψ|2 expresses
the probability that this particle is found at a given point,
assumes an entirely peculiar mechanism of action at a distance,
which prevents the wave continuously distributed in space from
producing an action in two places on the screen. In my opinion,
one can remove this objection only in the following way, that
one does not describe the process solely by the Schro¨dinger
wave, but that at the same time one localises the particle during
the propagation. I think that Mr de Broglie is right to search in
this direction. If one works solely with the Schro¨dinger waves,
interpretation II of |ψ|2 implies to my mind a contradiction
with the postulate of relativity.”[6]
Here Einstein is referring to Max Born’s interpreta-
tion in his seminal paper in 1926 [5], and the gedanken-
experiment Einstein proposes (Fig.2) is a simplified ver-
sion of the scattering of an electron by an atom Born
discusses in his paper. Einstein sharply perceived that
Born’s interpretation is linked to nonlocal coordination
of detectors. In fact it was the impossibility of explaining
this coordination by “causal evolution” what motivated
Born to his celebrated statistical interpretation, as we
discuss later in Section VIII.
Astonishingly Einstein’s gedanken-experiment in 1927
has been first realized using todays techniques in 2012
[7]. In this experiment (Fig.3) single photons impinge
into a beam-spitter BS and thereafter get detected. The
two detectors A and B monitoring the output ports of
BS are located so that the decision “to count” or “not
to count” at A is space-like separated and therefore lo-
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup to demonstrate nonlocal coor-
dination between decisions at detectors (in accord with Ein-
stein’s gedanken-experiment in Fig.2): photon pairs are gen-
erated by Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion at the
wavelengths of 1550nm and 810nm. These pairs are split by
a dichroic mirror (DM): the 810nm photon is sent to detector
D, used to herald the presence of the 1550nm photon, which
follows to the beam splitter (BS).[7]
cally independent from the decision “to count” or “not to
count” at B. The experiment tests and rules out the as-
sumption that this correlation can be explained by some
sort of local coordination through signals with v ≤ c:
Even if the decision at A is locally independent of the
decision at B, both decisions yield correlated results. On
the other hand this nonlocal coordination cannot be used
to signal faster than light from one detector to the other.
The experiment also highlights something Einstein did
not mention: Nonlocality is necessary to preserve such a
fundamental principle as energy conservation [7].
Einstein understood that the quantum mechanical de-
scription of single particle experiments involves nonlocal-
ity, but was not ready to swallow this.
III. DE BROGLIE-BOHM
Another important player at the 5th Solvay Conference
was Louis de Broglie. He presented an interpretation
different from the Copenhagen one, the so called “pilot-
wave” picture: In the experiment of Fig.1 the particle
always follows a well determined path from the source to
a detector, but there is a “pilot wave”, an undetectable
mathematical entity, that guides the particle to one or
other of the detectors taking account of the optical path-
length difference to producing the characteristic interfer-
ence fringes predicted by Quantum Mechanics.
Unfortunately Einstein misinterpreted de Broglie’s
“pilot wave” as a local alternative to the nonlocal
“Schro¨dinger waves” (the quantum mechanical “wave-
function”), as the quotation in the preceding Section II
reveals. The kind of “wave” Einstein had in mind was
sort of “ghost-wave” propagating in ordinary space-time
by the alternative path to the localised path the material
particle takes: it carries neither energy nor momentum,
and travels at the same speed of the particle. Thereby
one can assume that the outcome becomes determined
when the “ghost-wave” joins the particle at beam-splitter
BS1, and explain interference avoiding nonlocal coordi-
nation of decisions at detectors. Nonetheless one pays
the price of admitting entities propagating in space-time
that are inaccessible to observation even in principle. In
other words, to save relativistic local causality Einstein
was unconsciously discarding the Principle A, which is in
fact the fundamental principle of any experimental sci-
ence.
Eight years later (1935) Einstein proposed a new
thought experiment with two particles in the famous
EPR paper [8]. It looks like if Einstein had smelled that
his “ghost-waves” do not allow to escape nonlocality in
entanglement experiments. It may be also that he was
not ready to get rid of Principle A after all. As a mat-
ter of fact he never endorsed definitely the “ghost-wave”
model and abandoned his 1927 argument in favor of the
more complicated EPR one, arguing that Quantum Me-
chanics cannot be considered complete. But then the
question arises: Which kind of variables was Einstein
searching for to complete Quantum Mechanics? [8]
In whichever way one looks at it one can’t help con-
cluding he was looking for variables which are observ-
able in principle even if they couldn’t be detected by
available experimental techniques. In this sense it has
been claimed Einstein was supporting an “epistemic”
view that considers the quantum probabilities as “lack
of knowledge” [9]. This “epistemic view” bears a prob-
lem: If the variables are in principle accessible to ob-
servation, the experimenter could in principle know in
advance which path the particle will take, and thwart
the appearance of interferences by changing the length
of the other path. Thus, to fit interference experiments
“epistemicism” has to assume that nature coaxes the ex-
perimenter to adapt his/her choices to the properties the
particle carries. At the end of the day Einstein was deny-
ing the freedom of the experimenter, that is, endorsing
Superdeterminism.
Notice that Copenhagen can also be considered an
“epistemic” description, in the sense that the “wavefunc-
tion” describes only the possible knowledge we can have
about the “system”, but does not contain information
about the outcome of a single quantum event. In Bohr’s
wording: “There is no quantum world. There is only
an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong
to think that the task of physics is to find out how na-
ture is. Physics concerns what we can say about na-
ture.” However there is a big difference: “Bohr’s epis-
temicism” acknowledges that the information lacking in
the “wavefunction” is inaccessible to observation in prin-
ciple and, therefore, is not contained in space-time. If by
“world” one refers to “what is contained in space-time”,
then “there is no quantum world”, but there is a math-
ematical quantum reality existing in a mental realm we
cannot access with our senses. The “epistemic” descrip-
tion either endorses Superdeterminism or Principle Q.
Seventeen years after the EPR-paper David Bohm
published (1952) an article applying de Broglies picture
to describe the EPR gedanken-experiment [10]. In this
context it became clear that the “empty-wave” has noth-
ing to do with a “ghost-wave” propagating locally within
the ordinary 3-space, but is rather a mathematical en-
4tity defined in the so called “3N-space or configuration
space”([1] p. 128). Additionally, the wave acts like a
quantum potential involving action at a distance with
infinite velocity to produce space-like separated corre-
lated detections at the two sides of the setup. Because
de Broglie-Bohm postulates a “preferred frame” defining
a “before-after” relationship between two space-like cor-
related events it conveys the idea of nonlocal action at a
distance: one of the events is the cause and the other the
effect. However experimenters cannot use this “effect” to
communicate faster than light. This amounts to say that
the “before-after” relationship is a quality inaccessible to
real measurement, and therefore not contained in the ob-
servable world, that is, space-time. In other words, the
“wave” guides the “material particle” from outside the
ordinary space-time, i.e.: nonlocally.
The idea of causal action at a distance in the Bohmian
picture inspired John Bell to find a criterion for decid-
ing between Bohmian quantum nonlocal causality and
Einsteins relativistic local one by means of entanglement
experiments: The meanwhile famous Bell inequalities [1].
Since 1982 a number of well-known experiments have
ruled out Einsteins locality, upholding the quantum me-
chanical predictions with increasing accurateness. Ad-
ditionally, Bohmian picture inspired the “before-before”
experiment [11], which ruled out the nonlocal causal view
that “one event happens first and the other after”, and
led to the insight that “the correlations come from out-
side space-time” [12].
Ironically, because of the “prejudice” of temporal
causality de Broglie-Bohm could better than Copenhagen
bring into focus that quantum correlations cannot be ex-
plained by signals bounded by the velocity of light, and
triggered “nonlocality research”.
One may be tempted to think that de Broglie-Bohm
is “less weird” than Copenhagen since at least the for-
mer assumes well localized material particles and thereby
an ontological substrate. This would mean to overlook
Louis de Broglie’s big discovery that material particles
behave like waves: Particles are localized material enti-
ties only apparently, actually they consist in immaterial
waves. It is the very fundamental idea of the “wave-
packet”. Shaping a “wave-packet” means weaving “local
particles” with “nonlocal threads” (plane-waves) using
the tool of “Fourier transforms”. The idea that “local”
and “nonlocal” are inseparably united in the quantum
phenomena is undoubtedly the main characteristic of the
“particle-pilot wave” model. Nonetheless the idea was al-
ready present in de Broglie’s “wave-packet” description
for particles, and indeed in a way which was fully ac-
knowledged and worked out by the Copenhagen founding
fathers:
• Describing interference in experiments like that of
Fig.1 requires the notion of “wave-packet” charac-
terized by a coherence-time and coherence-length,
and yields the sinusoidal dependence on phases
characteristic of quantum correlations [13]. De-
pending on the optical path-length difference the
same “wave-packet” behaves like if it were a “wave”
producing phase-dependent counting rates, or like
if it were a “particle” producing phase-independent
counting rates.
• The impossibility of sharply measuring both a vari-
able and its Fourier transformed is the root of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
• “Single particle interference” implies that each
jointly outcome of the corresponding detectors
should be considered a single measurement result
coming from outside space-time: Different phases
define in general different bases and different mea-
surements incompatible with each other.
• De Broglie’s idea of the electron as wave-packet
plays a crucial role in Max Born’s description of
collision processes, where he introduces his rule
for calculating probabilities of outcomes in quan-
tum experiments [5]. Born’s paper shows well that
de Broglie’s view supports Copenhagen: Quan-
tum “particles” like an electron and an atom are
abstract mathematical descriptions that combine
to build a compound wave-function describing the
scattering of an electron by an atom. So parti-
cles exist in a mental realm till they become ma-
terialised in one of different possible experimental
outcomes (we comment on this more extensively in
Section VIII).
The important lesson of the whole story is that the “de
Broglie-Bohm” interpretation is itself essentially nonlo-
cal, although it can be misunderstood as local in single-
particle experiments, as Einstein did. Copenhagen and
de Broglie-Bohm are two different ways of stating Princi-
ple Q, rather than two interpretations irreconcilable with
each other.
IV. MANY-WORLDS
The strongest reaction against the “quantum collapse”
came from the so called Many-Worlds interpretation
(MWI).
This interpretation goes back to the relative state for-
mulation of Quantum Mechanics proposed by Hugh Ev-
erett 1957 [14]. “The fundamental idea of the MWI [...]
is that there are myriads of worlds in the Universe in ad-
dition to the world we are aware of. In particular, every
time a quantum experiment with different possible out-
comes is performed, all outcomes are obtained, each in
a different world, even if we are only aware of the world
with the outcome we have seen.”[15].
The parallel worlds and observers resulting at each
quantum experiment are in principle “experimentally”
inaccessible to each other.
Many-Worlds has been formulated in various ways.
David Deutsch uses the “Multiverse” formulation to ex-
plain the notion of a “quantum computer” [16]. The
5meaning of Many-Worlds is particularly well brought to
light in the formulation “Parallel lives” by Gilles Bras-
sard and Paul Raymond-Robichaud [17]. According to
this version: “When Alice pushes a button on her box,
she splits in two, together with her box. One Alice A
sees the red light flash on her box, whereas the other A*
sees the green light flash. Both Alices, A and A*, are
equally real. However, they are now living parallel lives:
they will never be able to see each other or interact with
each other. In fact, neither Alice is aware of the existence
of the other, unless they infer it by pure thought as the
only reasonable explanation for what they will experience
when they test their boxes.” [18]
Variants and extensions of Many-Worlds are properly
characterized by Frauchiger-Renner’s statement: “Their
common feature is that they do not postulate a physical
mechanism that singles out one particular measurement
outcome, although observers have the perception of single
outcomes.”[19] This characterization points also to what
may be a main inconsistency of Many-Worlds:
Indeed, according to Leibniz’s principle, “if there is
no possible perceptible difference between two objects,
then these objects are the same, not superficially, but
fundamentally” [20]. As far as one keeps to this prin-
ciple, if Alice in our world can never be able to see the
other Alice*, then one should conclude that Alice* has
no physical reality at all: Things that cannot in principle
be perceived by the senses do not exist within space-time.
And if the existence of Alice* can be inferred by reason-
ing but cannot in principle be perceived by the senses,
this means that Alice* exists outside space-time.
But one could object: Wouldn’t the latter statement
imply that events that happened in the distant past,
about which we just read in history books, but which
we cannot (and could not) perceive with our senses, do
not exist?
We access such events through observations we per-
form today: archaeological vestiges or writings docu-
menting them (see British museum). So these events
happened in our space-time. A past event that is in prin-
ciple inaccessible to any observation we can perform does
not belong to the physical reality we can describe.
The Alice* in the “parallel-lives” interpretation is
something we cannot access through any observation in
our world but only through reasoning. Accordingly, Al-
ice* lives outside our space-time, and is inaccessible to
our senses. This amounts to say that Alice* is a mental
entity outside my observable reality.
“Parallel lives” makes clear that “Copenhagen” and
“Many-Worlds” are basically equivalent: Both interpre-
tations imply that the “physical reality” we live in is more
than what we can access with our senses. We discuss this
further in the coming Section V.
V. ERNST SPECKER’S “INFUTURABILIEN”
AND ALL-POSSIBLE-WORLDS
Consider a conventional Bell experiment: On one side
of the setup Alice measures by switching her apparatus
either on position a1 or a2, and gets outcome either 1 or
0 in each measurement; on the other side far away, Bob
measures by switching his apparatus either on position
b1 or b2, and gets outcome either 1 or 0 in each measure-
ment. Suppose a measurement with joint choice [a1,b2]
yields the coincidence outcome [1,0]. According to Many-
Worlds the other possible outcomes [1,1], [0,1], [0,0] are
realized in parallel worlds and observed by corresponding
clones of Alice and Bob.
However, Many-Worlds to be consistent should also
consider all the possible choices Alice and Bob can do,
and assume that the other three possible joint choices
[a1,b1], [a2,b1], [a2,b2] are realized in parallel worlds as
well. Paraphrasing Nicolas Gisin: In Many-Worlds the
experimenter should not be merely a passive observer,
but play an active role [21]. Accordingly, in each experi-
ment the world would split in 16 parallel worlds.
But then one could as well think of a “razored” version
keeping only the parallel worlds corresponding to the dif-
ferent choices experimenters can do, and renounce to the
splitting corresponding to all the possible outcomes that
could happen in each choice.
This completed version of Many-Worlds leads straight-
forwardly to our proposal of “All-Possible-Worlds” [23]:
In the context of Ernst Specker’s “infuturabilien” parable
[22] one can consider that an “omniscient mind” assigns a
well-defined outcome for each of the four possible choices
Alice and Bob can make. For different rounds of a same
experiment (say [a1,b2]) assignments are done so that af-
ter many rounds the experimenters will observe joint out-
comes distributed according to the quantum mechanical
“Born’s rule”, and hence violating Bell’s inequalities.
“All-Possible-Worlds” illustrates well what quantum
contextuality means: The omniscient mind assigns re-
sults to each possible choice and each possible round,
however the assignment is not done for each single choice
of Alice and each single choice of Bob separately, but to
each possible pair of choices jointly. Consequently for
each round the outcome assignment for Alice’s choice
(say a1) depends on whether Bob chooses b1 (to perform
experiment [a1,b1]) or b2 (to perform experiment [a1,b2]).
This also means that the outcome (the “collapse”, un-
derstood in the sense of Assumption a) in Section II) is
actually the result of two decisions, that of the omni-
scient mind (when this assigns outcomes to all possible
experiments) and that of the experimenter (when this
decides to perform a determined experiment). Detection
(the measurement) does not “single out” the outcome, it
rather makes it visible.
Many-Worlds has the enormous merit of having
brought to light an important idea hidden in the Quan-
tum: The physical reality consists in all possible exper-
iments (choices) humans of all times can perform, the
6number of which is breathtaking huge but finite, as ex-
plained in [23]. These choices and the corresponding out-
comes are all present in Gods mind [24] but I am free to
choose the world I want to live in.
As David Deutsch states: “we find ourselves unavoid-
ably playing a role at the deepest level of the structure of
physical reality.”[16] And paraphrasing Scott Aaronson:
The mind of God works like a “tensor factor in Hilbert
space” to assigning outcomes to all possible rounds of all
possible experiments. Observed phenomena reveal what
the state of this mind is with relation to the particular
choices we freely make [25].
Some remarkable implications of “All-Possible -
Worlds” have been discussed in [23].
VI. FREE-WILL AS AXIOM OF QUANTUM
The conclusions in the preceding Sections can be
strengthened on the basis of Simon Kochen’s reconstruc-
tion of quantum mechanics [26, 27]. This reconstruction
illustrates well that any interpretation assuming free-will
acknowledges Principle Q.
The corner stone of Kochen’s reconstruction is found
in the following quotation referring to EPR experiments:
“How can correlations between spin components of two
particles subsist when these spin components do not have
values? To understand how this can happen it is neces-
sary to distinguish between events that have already hap-
pened and future contingent events. Thus, for instance,
if a∨ b is currently true, then either a is true or b is true.
When future events are considered, this no longer the
case: if a ∨ b is certain to happen, it is not the case that
a is certain to happen or b is certain to take place.”[27]
As a famous example of this logical feature Kochen
refers to Aristotle’s sea battle: “A sea-fight must either
take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it
should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that
it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either
should or should not take place tomorrow. Since propo-
sitions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in
future events there is a real alternative, and a potential-
ity in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation
and denial have the same character.” [27]
Here one implicitly introduces the following
Definition: An event a is called future contingent with
relation to a future time T, if to establish whether event
a takes place or not one has necessarily to await time T.
It is interesting to compare Aristotle’s example of the
“sea battle” with the statement: “The Sun will raise to-
morrow at time T at point P of the horizon”.
The “sea battle” is a future contingent event with re-
lation to “tomorrow”. By contrast, according to classical
physics the raising of the Sun is not a future contingent
event because it is assumed we can know today about it
with certainty.
According to the Definition above it is impossible even
in principle to predict with certainty whether event a will
take place or not on the basis of the currently observable
data, that is on the basis of information stored within
space-time.
This is the same as assuming that on the basis of clas-
sical physics we can establish neither that “a will happen
at time T” nor that “a will not happen at time T”. In
other words the Definition of future contingents is equiv-
alent to assuming that whether event a happens or not
at time T depends on information coming from outside
space-time at time T. And this is nothing other than as-
suming Principle Q.
The classical view implies actually that no event is fu-
ture contingent: Classically, any event results necessarily
through causal evolution.
In case of Aristotle’s sea battle Principle Q amounts to
postulate human free will, i.e.: steering of outcomes in
human brains happening from outside space-time; this
might also be the reason why Thomas Aquinas postu-
lates that “the universe would not be perfect without
randomness” [28]. Quantum experiments (single-particle
Mach-Zehnder interference, single-particle spin 1 Stern-
Gerlach, EPR-Bell experiments) allow us to go beyond:
We postulate free will on the part of the experimenter
and observe correlations between space-like separated de-
tection events; thereby we experimentally demonstrate
information coming from outside space-time in devices
other than human brains. This is the very meaning of
“the Free-Will Theorem” [27, 29].
In this very sense Nicolas Gisin emphasizes that Free-
Will is an axiom of physics. Interestingly Gisin relies
on the French philosopher Jules Lequyer [30], who was
strongly motivated by harmonizing divine omniscience
and future contingent events, the “Infuturabilien” ques-
tion which later inspired Erns Specker as well (Section
V).
It is noteworthy that Kochen’s reconstruction of quan-
tum mechanics is based on single particle Mach-Zehnder
interference experiments and introduces the sinusoidal
dependence on phases [26]. Even if no physical moti-
vation is given for such a dependence, Kochen’s recon-
struction makes it plain that any attempt to get Quan-
tum from principles assumes (openly or hiddenly) non-
local ingredients and the construction of “wave-packets”
by means of “Fourier transforms”.
In summary Kochen’s “logical” reconstruction of quan-
tum physics rests on Principle Q. So one can’t help ad-
miring how much quantum physics was already contained
in Aristotle’s logical description about the “sea battle”.
Quantum is intrinsically related to those assumptions al-
lowing us to shape rationally our ordinary daily life.
VII. MEANING AND AUTHORSHIP COME
FROM OUTSIDE SPACE-TIME
All the different interpretations of Quantum either hid-
denly deny the freedom of the experimenter (and there-
fore lead to Superdeterminism and are not proper in-
7terpretations of Quantum), or acknowledge Principles A
and Q.
Consider now the outcomes my brain produces while
I am typewriting this article. One could compare the
brain to the quantum interferometer in Fig.1: Depend-
ing of the physiological parameters of my brain an exper-
imenter may be capable of predicting how many percent
of each character of the alphabet (‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ) there
will be in the final text (similarly as he/she predicts e.g.:
57% of bit ‘1’ and 43% bit ‘0’ in the experiment of Fig.1).
By contrast there is no science (and there never will be
one) capable of predicting the order of the characters in
the final text (the particular bit-string 1,1,0,0,0,1,1,... re-
sulting after many rounds in the same experiment), and
therefore the message I want convey. I mentally steer
my brain’s outcomes, that is, the sequences of bits they
consist in, from outside space-time. This order, which is
inaccessible in principle to observation, is what commu-
nication is all about and makes our life meaningful.
Postulating that the order the outcomes appear is
beyond what physics can predict amounts to acknowl-
edge that authorship responsible for this order is outside
space-time. We assume such an authorship when we take
for granted conservation of personal identity in daily life.
This conservation is so fundamental that without it any
legal and social order would break down: We could nei-
ther claim for rights nor keep bank accounts. We assum-
ing it all the time while publishing scientific articles and
commenting each other’s papers. “Identity” as my agree-
ment to identify with the person named on my passport,
drivers license, bank and google accounts each and every
morning, is more than a world-line; reducing my life to
time-flow mean condemning myself to be none.
If there is no theory capable of predicting each sin-
gle choice a “human experimenter” decides to make or
the outcome the omniscient mind assigns to each single
round of the experiment we choose to perform, then there
is no theory of everything. We can only find theories al-
lowing us to predict statistical distribution of outcomes.
But as Chris Fuchs wisely states: “Finding a theory of
“merely” one aspect of everything is hardly something to
be ashamed of: It is the loftiest achievement physics can
have in a living, breathing nonreductionist world.” [31]
VIII. HOW DID MAX BORN GET TO
“BORN’S RULE”?
In his 1926 paper Max Born introduced a rule, which
became an essential ingredient of quantum physics: The
amplitudes (“Ausbeutefunktionen”) appearing in the
Schro¨dinger wave-equation are linked to probabilities of
different possible alternative outcomes [5].
Born’s rule was not simply a good guess coming from
nowhere, or a postulate without further justification. It
emerged from the struggle to account for basic physical
conditions in the problem of single electrons being scat-
tered by atoms [5], an experiment which as said (Sec-
tion II) Einstein simplified to the gedanken-experiment
in Fig.2 to argue that Born’s interpretation implies non-
local coordination at detection.
For the sake of simplicity we reproduce the essential
of Born’s argument in the context of the experiment in
Fig.1 using current standard notation:
The quantum mechanical description in terms of a
wavefunction leads to an expression of the form:
|ψ〉 = c0|0〉+ c1|1〉 (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 denote the outcome ’D(0) counts’,
respectively ’D(1) counts’; and c0, c1 are complex num-
bers resulting from summing amplitudes over paths from
the source to detector D(0), respectively D(1).
According to the “corpuscular” picture one gets only
one outcome: Either D(1) counts or D(0) counts. How-
ever in the right hand side of Equation (1) appear to-
gether the two possible outcomes: D(1) counts and D(0)
counts. So Equation (1) does not describe a causal evo-
lution from the source to a single detector: “From the
standpoint of our quantum mechanics there is no quan-
tity that in any individual case causally fixes the con-
sequence of the collision.”[5] This amounts to say that
the conditions ensuring that only one of the two detec-
tors counts lay beyond space-time and are inaccessible in
principle. They may derive from “a preestablished har-
mony” (“eine pra¨stabilierte Harmonie”) [5].
Born’s is facing the following dilemma: On the one
hand to behave rationally in the world we need receipts
allowing us to predict things to some extent. On the
other hand the fundamental fact that the outcome’s as-
signment is inaccessible in principle because it is not con-
tained in space-time and does not emerge through causal
evolution entails that there is no receipt allowing us to
predict each single outcome. The only possible interpre-
tation is that Equation (1) does not allow us to predict
with certainty but only to make a guess. Probability is a
measure of how accurate such a guess may be. So we have
to derive these probabilities from the quantities c0, c1 in
Equation (1), Born concludes.
So, Born’s claim that quantum physics “only specifies
probabilities, and not definite outcomes” [32] is derived
from “more fundamental principles”, mainly the need to
account for correlated decisions at detection “in absence
of conditions ensuring a causal evolution”. In stating that
“the only possible explanation” of the “wave function” is
probabilistic Max Born was in fact assuming Principle Q :
Quantum phenomena cannot be explained exclusively by
local causality but require “nonlocality at detection”, as
Einstein well understood (Section II).
Stating that quantum physics is “intrinsically proba-
bilistic” [3] amounts to state that Quantum refers to a
realm which is not fully contained in space-time and pre-
cludes explanation by causal evolution.
Born’s interpretation is amazingly close to the picture
“All-Possible-Worlds” described in SectionV:
• The “preestablished harmony” corresponds to the
8assignments the omniscient mind makes for all pos-
sible experimental choices humans of all times can
freely make (a finite number as explained in [23]).
• “Giving up determinism” corresponds to the as-
sumption that humans can freely chose which of
the possible worlds they want to live in.
• “Absence of conditions ensuring a causal evolution”
means that the state of the omniscient mind is
outside space-time, i.e.: contains correlated events
that are not predetermined by the past light-cone.
From the perspective of the omniscient mind, Born’s
rule probabilities mean the frequency of occurrences of an
outcome in the sequence of assignments this mind does,
which is the actual observed frequency in experiment. In
this sense the rule uses “frequentist probabilities” and can
be considered objective (as BornF in [35]).
From the perspective of the human experimenter,
Born’s rule quantifies a subjective belief about the out-
come of a future measurement under conditions of irre-
ducible uncertainty [4]. This interpretation (characteris-
tic of QBism [33, 34]) reflects the incapacity of principle
to access the result of a measurement before performing
it, and uses “Bayesian probabilities”. In this sense Born’s
rule can be considered subjective (as BornB in [35]).
For all practical purposes both interpretations are
equivalent, since the assignments in the omniscient mind
are done in such a way that the factual frequencies oc-
curring in experiment are well fitted by the Bayesian
probabilities. This “preestablished harmony” ensures
that “[we] can make rational decisions in the face of
uncertainty”[4], and behave rationally in the world we
live in. So the objective view and the subjective become
unified in “All-Possible-Worlds”.
In the same line of thinking one could also say that
Max Born was introducing probabilities to face “lack of
knowledge”. Nonetheless not “knowledge” we would be
able to get hold of with better apparatuses, but one that
is inaccessible to any apparatus we can built. By con-
trast Boltzmann thermodynamics probabilities appear
as a convenient tool to calculate a situation where it is
very difficult but not impossible to take account of each
single case. Interestingly at the end of his paper Born
feels the necessity to stress the difference between his
“statistical interpretation” and the “thermodynamical-
statistical” one.
So, stating that quantum physics is “epistemic” [9]
amounts to acknowledge Principle Q once again.
Furthermore Born’s reasoning is based on de Broglie’s
idea that a particle can be considered a wave packet ob-
tained by summing up plane waves of different frequen-
cies according to a Fourier transform relation (Section
III). The very introduction of “wave packets” amounts
to assume (paraphrasing Wheeler) (local) ’it’ from (non-
local) ’qubit’ as primitive for Quantum. This means that
the “quantum algebra” (leading to violation of Bell in-
equalities, “Tsirelson bound” and contextuality) emerges
in the context of experiments like that of Fig.1 [13]. In
particular the sum of the probabilities for the counting
rates of D(1) and D(0) has to be 1, and hence in Equation
(1) it holds that: |c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1 (unitary transforma-
tions); and in an experiment with the detectors watching
BS0 instead of BS1, the algebra must lead to the classical
probabilities. Such algebraic properties of the wavefunc-
tion formalism led Born to the famous footnote correction
(in [5], p. 865) that the probabilities are given by |ci|2,
i ∈ {0, 1}, and not by ci.
From this perspective “nonlocal coordination of deci-
sions at detectors” bears also “contextuality” (character-
izing Hilbert spaces with d ≥ 3) and “Bell’s nonlocality”
(characterizing Hilbert spaces with d ≥ 4, d non prime),
and so rules the whole quantum realm (Hilbert space
with d ≥ 2).
In summary: Max Born did not introduced his rule as
a “probabilistic axiom”. He derived it from more funda-
mental principles “without relying on an a priori notion
of probabilities” [35], mainly from “absence of conditions
ensuring causal evolution”, irreducible uncertainty, and
the Hilbert space properties embedded in the description
of particles as“wave-packets” (it from qubit).
One can easily see that the derivation of Born’s rule
from three “operational postulates or primitives” in [36]
contains much of Born’s reasoning we have referred to.
This becomes clear if one does not forget to introduce
detectors into the definition of “measurement”: Mea-
surements without detectors have no outcomes. Mateus
Arau´jo remarks that [36] leaves hanging the question:
“Why does the Born rule only specifies probabilities and
not definite outcomes?” [32]. In fact the question could
be answered because “absence of conditions assuring a
causal evolution” or “preestablished harmony” is implic-
itly assumed in the postulate “states”.
It is also noteworthy that in [35] the authors claim to
derive Born’s rule from “two alternative non-probabilistic
physical postulates” together with “certain natural as-
sumptions concerning the agent’s reasoning” that “do not
depend on quantum mechanics”. As we have seen, this
is actually what Max Born did: Assumption “Symmetry”
in [35] states that “the agents belief about a sequence
of outcomes obtained by repeating the same prepare-
and-measure experiment does not depend on how the
sequence is ordered”; this amounts to assume that the
order of the sequence is beyond what physics can pre-
dict and therefore “absence of conditions ensuring causal
evolution” (Section VII). Assumption “Overlap” implic-
itly involves nonlocal coordination at detection. And As-
sumption “Repeat” implicitly contains the Hilbert space
algebra to calculate a path’s amplitude.
IX. CONCLUSION
As early as 1927 Einstein was perfectly aware that
single-particle nonlocality, later demonstrated in the ex-
periment of [7], is the source where Quantum emerges
9from. His denial of this feature ignited a debate that crys-
talised into three main interpretations of quantum the-
ory: Copenhagen, de Broglie-Bohm, and Many-Worlds.
In this letter we have shown that these interpretations
are different ways of stating the same from different per-
spectives: Not all what matters for physical phenomena
is contained in space-time (Principle Q).
The three interpretations highlight different relevant
aspects, which can be unified into the “All-Possible-
Worlds” picture: The quantum realm is a huge collec-
tion of All-Conceivable-Histories. Paraphrasing John A.
Wheeler: The entirety of quantum phenomena, rather
than being built on particles or fields of force or multidi-
mensional geometry, is built upon billions upon billions of
elementary human decisions ([34] p.32, note 35). With-
out “human free choices”, no physical reality! Personal
identity and free will are axioms of science included in
Principle Q, natural assumptions about rational reason-
ing and behavior.
Principle Q underpins Max Born’s introduction of
probabilities into quantum physics. The founding fathers
undoubtedly derived Quantum from “a set of experimen-
tally motivated postulates” [37] or “more fundamental
principles” [35], which in the light of nonlocality and
contextuality acquire a much deeper meaning: By postu-
lating “absence of conditions ensuring causal evolution”
and knowledge which is in principle inaccessible to the
human experimenter, they were assuming Principle Q.
Quantum means endorsing Principle Q, which we as-
sume all the time to found rationally interpersonal rela-
tionship. Quantum “weirdness” is helping us to realize
how wonderful ordinary life is.
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